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ECONOMIC  MALAISE  SLOWS  REFORM: A REVIEW  OF
CURRENT  CONDITIONS  IN  THE SOVIET  UNION
Karl D. Skold
In  January of 1990, Moscovites were introduced to  litical instability and a potentially  massive wave of
"Big Maks" and "Kartofel fries" with the opening of  refugees flowing to the West forced European coun-
a new McDonald's franchise in the heart of Moscow.  tries, in particular, to dig deep into their pockets. The
A short time later, article six of the Soviet constitu-  Bush administration's reluctance to support a broken
tion was amended to remove the Communist Party's  system gave  way as pressure  mounted  to  support
legal  monopoly  on  power.  By  the  end  of  1990,  beleaguered U.S. agricultural exports. The Bush ad-
McDonald's had surpassed the Lenin Mausoleum as  ministration eventually offered the Soviet Union $1
the prime  attraction in Moscow.  The line for "Big  billion in financial guarantees for the importation of
Maks" is now longer than the line for viewing the  agricultural  commodities,  the  largest  first-time
preserved  founder  of the  Soviet  communist  state.  GSM-102  allocation.  This is on top of the billion-
Between these events a cavalcade  of economic and  plus  dollars  offered  by  the European  Community
political  events  occurred.  The  pace  of new  an-  and an assortment of other countries. In Germany, a
nouncements  and decrees  quickened during the last  telethon  was  conducted  to  raise  money  for  food
half of 1990 as the economy began to crumble.  relief.  Food relief has been donated from countries
The icons of  the Soviet Union are slowly changing.  such  as  India,  Japan,  Germany,  and  the  United
The evolution of the  Soviet Union from a command  States.  Even the Iraqi government offered dates  to
economy to a market-oriented  economy is proving  the Soviets.
more  painful  than  Mikhail  Gorbachev  realized  The hallmark of 1990 in the Soviet Union has been
when, nearly  six  years  ago, he ushered  in  "peris-  the political  maneuvering  and  reshuffling,  which
troika," a slogan that in translation means  "restruc-  intensified with the dismal performance of the econ-
turing."  The  success  of  peristroika  has  been  the  omy.  In  particular,  the  successes  and  failures  of
renewal of political debate and freedom of expres-  Soviet agriculture  have renewed  resistance and in-
sion  in the  Soviet  Union.  Authority,  or  perhaps  sistence for change in agricultural and rural policy.
claims thereof, has moved from the central authori-  The  food situation  has  renewed  attention  toward
ties to regional  and republic  governmental bodies.  agriculture and its vital role in the success of  reforms
All of the fifteen republics,  along with several  re-  in the Soviet Union. In the brief space allocated, an
gions, have declared to various degrees their auton-  overview of the general economic conditions will be
omy  and  sovereignty  from  the  center.  However,  made.  Reasons for the plight of consumers  will be
peristroika has failed to revitalize the Soviet econ-  discussed, with particular emphasis on the agricul-
omy. The political jousting is increasing as the lot of  tural and food sectors.  Recent  land ownership pro-
the average Soviet citizen continues to decline, and  posals  will  be  reviewed  briefly.  Finally,  an
chaos in economic and political relations increases.  assessment of the pace and direction of reform will
The inability of the Soviet agricultural and distri-  be made.
bution system  to produce  and  deliver  basic food-
stuffs has heightened and highlighted the crisis that  GENERAL ECONOMIC DECLINE
exists. Shortages of consumer goods and food have  While uncertainty  pertaining  to the political out-
led  to  widespread  rationing  which  has  added  to  come and makeup  of the Soviet Union still  exists,
disillusionment about the wisdom of peristroika. For  the economic  conditions  in the  Soviet  Union  are
the U.S., the Soviet Union has shifted from a fairly  certain.  The  economy  and normal economic  rela-
dependable cash buyer of agricultural imports  to a  tionships are unraveling. Official Soviet estimates of
buyer dependent  on foreign credit and even emer-  net material product  (NMP) growth for  1990 show
gency food donations. Financial credits for food and  a marked decline, particularly in the latter half of the
medical imports have flooded into the Soviet Union  year.  NMP, a measure of aggregate production,  de-
as  the  consequences  of  the  disintegration  of the  dined  4  percent  in  1990  after  increasing  by  2.5
country have become clear. Fears of spreading  po-  percent in 1989 (IMF). The decline in NMP was lead
Karl D. Skold is a Commodity Analyst with the Quaker Oats Company,  Chicago, Illinois.
Copyright  1991, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
97by the transportation and construction sectors. Par-  delivery  system  are  ceasing  to  exist.  The  central
ticularly painful declines  were found in the energy  planning  system  and  the  various  ministries  that
and metals  sectors.  Oil and coal  output was down  monitor and control the economy are less influential.
sharply in 1990 (oil output was down over 6.9 per-  New economic relationships are slowly forming, but
cent in the third quarter of 1990). Production prob-  have not replaced  the old system.  Most goods are
lems due to outdated technology  and a dissatisfied  reportedly in short supply. Soap, footwear, clothing,
work force  have  plagued  the energy  sector.  Total  and tobacco are  scarce.  Even staples  such as salt,
industrial output is expected  to drop  1.1 percent in  bread,  flour,  and pasta  are  sporadically  found  in
1990  (PlanEcon).  The drop  in aggregate  output is  shops.
probably more severe than official estimates depict.  Gorbachev  has failed to present  a coherent  eco-
Incorporating  hidden inflation (price increases  not  nomic policy.  The Shatalin Plan that offered a 500
measured  because  of supposed  offsetting  quality  day timetable to a free market economy with massive
improvements) would lower the value of the output  privatization  and  private  property  provisions  was
further (IMF).  rejected in October 1990. The compromise proposal
In 1990,  gross agricultural  output is expected  to  adopted carries some  of the flavor  of the Shatalin
increase  only 0.5  percent,  even with a near record  Plan, but it lacks the timetable and is considered by
grain harvest of an expected  235 million tons. The  critics to  be unworkably  vague in key areas  (e.g.,
crop sector will have increased by 4 percent, but the  private property). The flavor of the compromise plan
animal products sector will have declined by about  is to retain the center's power and control over key
2 percent from year ago  levels. Feed shortages and  resources.  Macroeconomic  stabilization  and retain-
supply  problems  have  plagued  the  meat  and  egg  ing an income floor will be emphasized.  Price re-
sectors.  During the first half of 1990, meat produc-  forms and shifting of the control over the economy
tion was down nearly 2 percent, and egg production  to republics, regions, and enterprises will be gradual.
was down 2.5 percent from the same period a year  A  succession  of  recent  presidential  decrees  have
earlier.  In 1990, flour and mixed feedstuffs  produc-  reinforced the center's control over economic activi-
tion will have  declined by  about  0.9 percent  from  ties.
1989. Slight declines are found in all segments of the
food processing sectors from sugar and bread pro-  INCREASED DEMAND, FEWER GOODS
duction to fruits, vegetables, and pasta.  Even with declines in aggregate output, wages, and
PlanEcon  estimates  of  1990  economic  activity,  salaries have kept expanding (PlanEcon). However,
based  on official  estimates  during  the  first  three  the expansion  in wages and  salaries  appears to  be
quarters  of the  year,  suggest a bright  spot in eco-  slowing. Wages and salaries of workers increased on
nomic activity.  The production of consumer goods  average 8.4 percent during the first three quarters of
is  expected  to  increase  by  about  4.2 percent  and  1990 over the corresponding  1989 levels. This fol-
producer goods production is expected to decline 3  lows an average 9.4 percent  increase in  1989 over
percent  from  1989  levels.  Private  consumption  is  the 1988 level. However, average wages and salaries
officially estimated to increase in 1990 by 3 percent  remained fixed at 257 rubles per month during the
above the previous  year.  Consumer goods produc-  first three quarters of 1990. Efforts to hold wage and
tion has outpaced producer  goods for the last three  salary increases in check appear to be working.
years.  Favoring  consumer  goods  over  producer  Salaries  of collective  farm  workers  followed  a
goods (in particular the machine tool industry)  is a  similar trend. During the first three quarters of 1990,
recent and needed reversal in policy direction (Gold-  collective farm workers'  pay increased, on average,
man).  In  addition  to  increases  in consumer  good  by just over 8 percent above year-ago  levels. In the
production, the service sector continues to grow. The  third  quarter  of  1990,  collective  farmers'  pay  in-
net result is gross domestic product (GDP) declined  creased  to  181  rubles per month, just 5.2  percent
by  about  2 percent  in  1990,  less  than the drop  in  above  a  year  ago.  Thus,  constraints  on wage  in-
aggregate output.  creases  may  be  also  successful  on the  collective
The official  estimates of economic  activity mask  farms.  However,  collective  farm wages may jump
the toil of everyday life. While official estimates of  again during the fourth quarter of 1990 and into 1991
aggregate  supplies  of most  consumer  goods  and  if  foodstuffs price increases are passed on to workers
foodstuffs are at worst only moderately lower than a  of collective farms. During the first three quarters of
year ago, empty shelves and long lines are everyday  1990, pay for workers in cooperatives increased  10
occurrences  for most  Soviet shoppers.  The service  to 15 percent from year-ago levels. The expansion of
sector is growing,  but service remains a virtual un-  cooperative workers'  pay has slowed from its rate of
known. The normal channels of the distribution and  change in  1989. In 1989, cooperative workers' pay
98increased 71 to  127 percent above its level in 1988.  is to clamp down on black market activity. Also, it
In  1988,  the cooperative  movement was  in its in-  will cut the money supply. However, the main result
fancy, and thus cooperative members reaped excep-  of the  measure  will  be  to  eliminate  individuals'
tionally large profits.  savings and further the distrust of the future reform
The rise in wages  and salaries has increased  the  proposals.
amount  of money  in circulation.  These rubles  are
chasing fewer goods. This expansion in demand has  POLICY WORSENS SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS
propelled  inflation.  Officially, retail price  inflation  c  '^~~  e . T•  1-Disruptions  in the supply of consumer goods and, was about 5 percent  in  1990. During  the third and  . . a  5 prcnt  in  1  Din  t  tir  a  in particular, foodstuffs have been partly policy-in- fourth quarters of 1990, inflation surged. During thel  e  mic m  ie 
cr\  .i X•~  .•~  .~  .~  duced. Of course, the general economic malaise and first half of 1990, retail price inflation averaged less  i  political power shifts are also contributing factors in than  3  percent,  slightly  above  the level  of  1989
'  . . l.-  L c  'it  ithe  breakdown of economic relations. Nevertheless, inflation,  which  was  officially  estimated  to  be  2  i  .a  i  rtio
policies  have  induced  regional  trade  disruptions percent.  Correcting  for  hidden  inflation  suggests  ii  h  inded  within  the  interdependent  Soviet  economy.  The consumer prices may be increasing  8  to  11 percent  A  n  "  i  "New  Agrarian  Policy"  introduced  at  the  March per year  in  1990  (PlanEcon).  Izvestla,  a  leading per  year  in  1990 (anEon1989  plenum  called  for  regional  self-sufficiency. newspaper, estimates that annual inflation is about  newspaper,  estimates  that anual inflation is about  Regions were urged to be less reliant on the center's 18 percent and  climbing (Reuter's).  Some Western  food and feed stocks. Local regions were allowed to sources estimate inflation  is galloping  at 5 percent  . keep more of their above-plan  output.  State orders per  month,  or  80  percent  compounded  annually per  month,  or  80  percent  compounded  annually  that dictated output deliveries  to the center were to
(Wall Street Journal). .(Wall  Street  Journal1.)  . allow farms  more flexibility and discretion in their
Fears  of further  economic  and political  turmoil  ketings. Fas  could sell more above-plan out- marketings.  Farms could sell more above-plan out-
have exacerbated  the demand  for goods  and  food-  elsewhere  and put at private kolkhoz markets  and elsewhere  and
stuffs.  Consumers are  eager to turn excess savings  r  reap  the benefits  of higher,  market  prices.  Farms
into anything that may be a store of value. Hoarding  were to be unburdened  from the bureaucratic med-
and panic buying have increased  as the number of  dg  in tr  p  g to h  dling min  their planning to harvesting decisions. goods at state  prices has diminished.  Buying  most
desired goods and foodstuffs at state level prices is  The goal of these measures was to stimulate pro-
a  near  impossibility,  even  with  the  expansion  in  duction. Yet, most of the dictates of the plenum were
consumer goods production.  The state commission  not successful. Farms were not unburdened from the
that monitors product  availability in state stores es-  center's authority. Bureaucratic meddling remained.
timates that 996 of the total  1000 items monitored  Most decisions still were not made on the farm. Crop
are in short supply (Economist).  choice,  rotational  plans,  and  even  harvest  timing
With the lack of items  to buy at affordable  state  decisions were made off the farm. State orders didn't
prices,  the  level  of involuntary  savings  has  in-  release farms from the bureaucrats' grip and did not
creased. Consumers  have been willing to save less  increase marketing flexibility.
in savings  deposits  and show more willingness  to  However,  part of the policy stuck.  The push for
hold hoards of ready cash to buy sporadically  avail-  regional self-sufficiency increased. Farms delivered
able items.  The level of savings in savings deposits  less to the center, as demonstrated by the declines of
relative to retail  sales began to weaken toward  the  deliveries to the all-union fund.  In 1989, state pro-
end  of  1990  (PlanEcon  Report).  However,  the  curements  of grain, as  a share  of output were  the
"monetary overhang" continues to build.  Total sav-  lowest in thirty years (USDA 1990). In response, the
ings (including both savings deposits and cash hold-  central authorities offered convertible rubles for cer-
ings) continues to increase relative to retail sales. In  tain commodities.  This  did not pry grain from the
late October 1990, Gorbachev issued a decree man-  farms' hands. In May 1990, grain prices were raised
dating a dramatic rise in interest rates that will give  90 percent  to give  more incentive to  deliver com-
a better  incentive  to  hold  excess  cash  in  savings  modities  to  the  all-union  fund.  Later,  televisions,
deposits.  In the decree, interest rates were raised to  refrigerators,  automobiles,  and trucks were also of-
as much as  9 percent on savings deposits  from the  fered to farms for the delivery of above-plan grain to
then-current maximum of 3 percent. More recently,  the  center.  To  induce  livestock  procurements,  the
Gorbachev has decreed that 50 and  100 denomina-  government also announced it would raise producer
tion ruble notes  will no longer be a legal  form of  prices on January  1, 1991. This caused producers to
tender.  Individuals  can redeem  the lower  of  1000  hold back inventories from slaughter to capture the
rubles or their monthly salary for smaller denomina-  higher prices after the new year. Meat shortages were
tion notes. The announced purpose of this measure  the result. Later, the government moved up the date
99for the livestock price increase to October 1, 1990 to  limited to residents of the city only. Leningrad has a
increase the supply of meat.  similar rationing program. In the Ukrainian Repub-
In  1990,  state  procurements  for grain  increased  lic,  ration  coupons  are  part  of workers'  salaries.
slightly  above  the  1989  level, but still  are,  as  of  Thus, the ration coupons restrict the ability of con-
November  11, only 74 percent of planned procure-  sumers  to spend  rubles  since they  receive  a fixed
ments (Reuter's).  State procurements for other corn-  amount of coupons each pay period.
modities  relative  to  1989  procurement  rates  were  The end result of these forms of local protection-
down considerably.  By November  1, 1990, procure-  ism is a further diminished supply of goods. Farms
ment of vegetables  was down 14 percent relative to  and  other  enterprises  are  even  more  reluctant  to
that date in 1989, and potato procurements by Octo-  deliver output to the center when residency restric-
ber 23, 1990 were 29 percent below the correspond-  tions prohibit  buying  in  the cities  to  which their
ing  1989  level  (PlanEcon).  Meat  and  poultry  output flows.  Fears of political chaos and possible
procurements  were down 3.7 percent, and egg pro-  civil war reinforce tendencies to curtail trade.
curements were down 2 percent during the first three
quarters of 1990 as compared to the same period in  MARKET DISEQUILIBRIUM
1989 (PlanEcon).  Along with the price increase, the  ADDS TO CHAOS
lack of protein feed availability has also contributed  Policy-induced disruptions in the flow of goods are
to shortages  in short-term meat supplies.  Shortages  not entirely to blame for the increasingly  sporadic
have been so acute that livestock and poultry produc-  supply of goods. The reluctance  of farms and other
ers have been forced to slaughter animals.  enterprises  to sell goods to the government at state-
Additionally,  economic regionalism has been po-  level prices can also be explained by simple econom-
litically motivated. Local officials fear losing politi-  ics.  The discrepancy  between  the state-level prices
cal  power.  Officials  have  sought  to  keep  local  and the prices in private or kolkhoz markets and the
supplies plentiful  as a means of placating their con-  black  market is  widening.  Soviet  prices have  not
stituents. Local  autarchy  is reinforced  by a general  been altered substantially since the  1950s. Efforts to
belief by officials that their particular region or re-  raise and rationalize state-level prices have been met
public does not get its fair share in trade, and hence  with resistance. A proposed July 1, 1990 bread price
gives more than it receives. Distorted prices that are  increase  was  cancelled  after  consumer outcry  and
not reflecting  true scarcity value reinforce this per-  panic.  In November  1990, the  central government
spective.  Regional  trade disruptions  are many.  For  ordered  prices  freed  on  luxury  goods  (auto  parts,
example, in late November 1990,  Moscow was hit  furniture, carpets, electronics, furs, and caviar). The
by  a  milk  blockade.  Areas  around  Moscow  that  Russian  Republic  immediately  suspended  the de-
normally supply the city's milk held back deliveries  regulation. The Russian Republic indicated that the
to supply their own regional needs. Republics have  price hike would need to be ratified by their Supreme
also imposed  trade restrictions.  The Ukrainian  Re-  Soviet, the legislative body of the republic.
public has prohibited exports to other regions of food  Kolkhoz market prices  are higher than state  and
produced above plan targets. The Estonian Republic  cooperative store prices, since some resemblance of
has banned  food  sales  outside of its borders.  The  scarcity value is suggested. However, during the first
Republic  of Uzbeckistan  has  similar  food  export  three quarters of 1990, kolkhoz market prices have
restrictions.  risen 24 percent above their 1989 level (PlanEcon).
These  trade  barriers  hit  the  industrial  cities  the  In state  and  cooperative  stores,  prices rose during
hardest. City leaders are forced to institute rationing  this  same  time period  only by  3.6  and  6  percent,
and limit purchases to the residents of the particular  respectively.  In September 1990, the prices of meat
city or region.  The goals of these measures  are  to  and eggs sold at private markets were, respectively,
prevent hoarding  and black market activity, and to  30 and 17 percent higher than the corresponding date
provide  a means  of distributing  goods on a basis  in  1989.
more equitable  than the ability  to  endure hours  in  Efforts to control cooperative  and kolkhoz market
lines.  In 1989,  sugar was the principle  commodity  prices  have  been  revived.  Individual,  family,  and
universally rationed. By the end of 1990, commodity  cooperative  businesses were  legalized in the spring
and  consumer  good  rationing  became  common  of  1987.  By October  1989,  the local  governments
across the country. In June 1990, the city of Moscow  were given the right to set ceilings on the cooperative
instituted rationing  of basic commodities.  By No-  prices.  Resale  of commodities  purchased  at state
vember,  Moscow  had  widened  rationing  to  cover  prices was banned.  Further  controls were added in
clothes,  footwear,  domestic  appliances,  sporting  June 1990 to control the financial  activities of these
goods, and cigarettes.  Meat and dairy products  are  enterprises. Some locales continually harass and bu-
100reaucratically  interfere in order to restrict coopera-  elderly and feeble the most. They are the segments
tive  and kolkhoz  market activity.  The  inability  to  of society unable to stand in the lines and search for
obtain  inputs plagues  the  cooperative  movement,  the most recent shipments.  They are also  the seg-
The Krasnodar Region has a total ban on coopera-  ments  of society  with  meager  incomes  and  little
tives (USDA 1990).  choice  in their food buying alternatives.  Food aid
The disequilibrium  in food  and consumer goods  and financial assistance will be of value if it reaches
markets  offers  even more incentive  to trade in the  these  segments  of society.  The empty shelves  and
black  market,  a mainstay  of the Soviet  economy.  long lines are a reality, but much of the food supply
Items  such as cigarettes,  automobile  parts,  quality  is purchased at the workplace, from friends, and the
meat,  and color  televisions  can  sell  for up  to  ten  kolkhoz markets. The normal  distribution channels
times their state-level price. Pressure has mounted to  are not working and  are slowly being  replaced  by
curb  the "speculators"  who  take advantage  of the  new alternative networks.  Also, particularly in rural
economic rents in the black market. Efforts to curtail  areas,  garden  plots  are  carefully  tended  and pro-
black market activity will suppress other legal forms  duced the bulk of families' food needs. Policies and
of entrepreneurial activities. The legality and moral-  economics increasingly have disrupted the supply of
ity of unearned income has continued as a controver-  food and consumer goods to the consumer. The gap
sial issue  (Johnson).  Buying  low  and selling  high  between the market clearing price and the state price
remains an ideologic hurdle to overcome.  A presi-  has widened. This does not imply famine.  Rather it
dential decree now empowers self-appointed worker  implies a painful institutional transition.
groups to monitor and supervise the distribution of
food.  These food vigilantes  can close down enter-  MORE DECREES TO ASSIST
prises and initiate criminal proceedings against indi-  AGRICULTURE
viduals accused of stealing or selling food for profit.  The food problems have underscored  the need to
The  KGB,  the  state  security  agency,  has  been  improve the performance  of the agricultural  sector.
charged to "fight economic sabotage" and has been  Much  of the  blame  can  be  placed  on  antiquated
ordered  to  organize  special  units  to  protect  food  transportation,  distribution,  and  food  processing
supplies and monitor distribution across the country.  sectors, as well as the barriers to trade and commerce
In  January  1991,  the  KGB  was  given  additional  discussed previously.  As suggested earlier, propos-
powers to search and examine enterprises (including  als from the March  1989 plenum have so far done
foreignjoint ventures) and their financial documents  little  to  transform agriculture.  Problems  in imple-
without warning.  menting agricultural policy have been aggravated by
The inability to convert the ruble into goods pres-  the diminished power of the center. Local authorities
sures farms and other enterprises into barter arrange-  have usurped the center's power and can influence
ments.  Goods are better to hold than money.  Thus,  the direction and scope of agricultural policy at the
the inability to convert ruble plagues internal trade  local level. Local party officials have a freer reign in
as well as western businesses attempting to engage  creating  their own policy  slants.  This blurring  of
in commerce in the Soviet Union. The government's  decrees can occur at the republic, oblast (region), and
offer of appliances  and cars for grain  is an institu-  district levels.
tionalized form of barter. Farms and enterprises bar-  Furthermore,  through  reduced  deliveries  to  the
ter their  output and hoard stocks to  obtain needed  state, farms have demonstrated an increasing reluc-
inputs  and  goods  for  their employees.  Barter  ar-  tance to follow blindly decrees  and mandates from
rangements have been formed even between repub-  above.  The reduced output deliveries to the state is
lics and regions.  The devolution  of authority  away  an indication  of the  center's diminished  authority.
from the  center has facilitated these arrangements.  Also, the center's ability to dictate the use and flow
However, recent presidential decrees have outlawed  of  resources has been reduced. The Communist party
trade arrangements among republics and individual  has been the  key mechanism coordinating  shifts in
enterprises.  rural labor and other resources  in critical peak har-
Food and consumer goods have become even more  vest  periods.  This  coordinating  function  is  farm
difficult  than usual  to  buy.  However,  the  fear  of  planning  and resource allocation across the country
famine in  the Soviet  Union has been exaggerated,  has been weakened. Evidence of this can be seen in
and often for political gain. Average per-capita con-  the  1990 Soviet grain crop which was a near record
sumption  levels in  1989  in the Soviet  Union were  (the current USDA estimate of Soviet grain produc-
close  to Soviet consumption norms  (USDA  1990).  tion is 235 million metric tons, slightly lower than
In 1990, aggregate food production was only slightly  the  Soviet  grain  harvest  in  1978  of 237  million
lower  than in  1989.  Food  scarcity  will  affect  the  metric tons (USDA 1991). Stanislav Shatalin, a lead-
101ing economist, expected that half of the 1990 grain  ing. In the Russian Republic, through the first half
crop would be lost because of the inability to harvest,  of  1989,  43  percent  of  the  collective  farms  had
and then process, food.  Most estimates place grain  signed  lease  contracts,  and  9 percent  of the farm
harvest losses at  30 percent.  Only after  pleas from  workers were working under lease contract arrange-
officials  from  Gorbachev  on  down  did  the  work  ments  (Brooks,  October  1990).  In  the  Stavropol
force mobilize to bring in the harvest. Harvest delays  Krai,  only  2  of the  72  farms  answering  a mailed
due to fuel  and equipment  shortages  and weather  survey  reported lease contracting in  1989.  Validity
increased losses.  of  existing  lease  arrangements  are  questionable,
In this environment,  the basic direction in Soviet  since many are simply renamed existing labor-pay-
agricultural policy has been to  introduce more ac-  ment arrangements.
countability.  Financial accountability  of farms has  Currently,  a lack  of consensus  pervades  agricul-
been  improved  marginally  with the imposition  of  tural policy.  The response to past policy initiatives
self-financing and cost accounting procedures. Self-  has been lackluster.  Some point to the glaring waste
financing  has  reduced  some  subsidies  and  credit  in moving products from the farm to consumer and
availability, and has introduced some financial integ-  call for increased investment in infrastructure, proc-
rity to the state and collective farms.  However, the  essing, and farm input manufacturing. They contend
financial  crisis  in  agriculture  remains.  The actual  farms are  able  to produce  the nation's  needs,  but
impacts  of recent  decrees  that have  allowed  debt  simply do not have adequate resources. Others point
write-off are still  unclear.  The decrees  do provide  to the past failures of grandiose investment schemes,
incentives to form farm leasing arrangements which  low productivity levels, and the relatively high cost
could possibly improve resource use and productiv-  of production as demonstrating the need for institu-
ity (Brooks, October 1990).  tional change.  They contend that more investment,
Increased labor accountability was thought to spur  expanding  the arable land base, and promises of an
on productivity and to decrease costs,  and thus im-  improved  society were no longer viable policy op-
prove the standard of living of the rural population.  tions.  However, the  crux of the agricultural policy
Individual farm workers were to have the results of  struggle  is  the  role  of  the  limitations  on  private
their  labor  tied more  closely  to  their  pay.  Giving  property.
proper incentives to the "human factor" was the key
to  improving  agriculture.  Before  the March  1989  F0  Law on Land gave individuals
plenum, improving the incentives and accountability  the  right  to  hold  private  property  (see  Van  Atta,
of  agricultural  workers  was  sought  primarily  March  1990; Gray).  The implementation of the law
has been passed on to the congresses of the republics. through the alternative labor payment method (e.g.,  has been passed on to thecongressesof the republics.
"ot valovogo dokhoda') and the collective contract  Under the law, individuals and other groups have the
(see Brooks,  January  1990  and  Van Atta,  January  right to leave a collective farm and obtain land equal
1990,  for  historical  perspectives).  The  collective  to the average holding of  the farm. This land can then
be leased for life from the local soviets.  Inheritance contract instituted work teams that supposedly gave  i  a  t t  rit  t
workers more  discretion  in  their decision  making  the riht to  u  se  i
and provided them with higher pay for better work.  December  1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Mechanisms such as these that tie laborers'pay more  pRepublic broadened  the rights of holders of private
closely to the profitability or output of the farm were  property  that republic. Under the law, independent
ineffective,  but reportedly  were  widely  adopted.  farm  ers  a  tae  oession  land from collective
During  1989,  in the Stavropol Krai, a region of the  andstatefarms afterobtaining permissonfromlocal
Russian Republic, over three-fourths of the 72 farms  authorities.  The land  can not be sold freely  Only
that  answered  a  mailed  questionnaire  used  such  after  ten years can the land be sold, and then only
methods  (Skold  and  Popov).  Across  all  farms  the  b 
level of farm worker pay was about the same.  Also in December  1990, Gorbachev  issued a de-
After  the march  1989  plenum,  long-term  leases  cree that increased the amount of land available for
were  made possible.  Gorbachev's  mandate  was to  family  plots. He  announced  that  land  used ineffi-
make  "man  the master  of the  land."  Individuals,  ciently would be turned over to a land bank and then
families,  and cooperatives  were allowed  to partici-  distributed to peasants. However, most farm workers
pate in leases. Land could be leased from collective  already have access to small plots land. It is too early
and state farms and also from local soviets (councils)  to tell how the category of inefficient  land will be
if the land was vacant. Leases could last up to fifty  determined. In the non-black earth zone, thousands
years and be passed on to heirs of the lessee. Little  of hectares have been abandoned and  are available
evidence exists of the adoption rate of lease contract-  for  private  farming.  However,  this  area  lacks  the
102necessary rural infrastructure to tempt skilled, entre-  investment  resources,  and thus not wanted  by  the
preneurial farmers to stake claims.  existing state and collective farm structure (Gray).
The  legality  of these  private  property  arrange-  A shortage of skilled laborers with entrepreneurial
ments is still in question.  Republic  and  local inter-  skills  is  yet  another  reason  for  slow  adoption  of
pretations  of  the  land  law  will  vary.  Individual  individual farming.  Farm workers tend to be quite
farming in some republics has already been adopted  specialized, and thus only few are able to perform all
rapidly. In the Georgian Republic,  16,000 small fam-  of the farming operations. Furthermore, independent
ily farms of less than half a hectare have been cre-  farmers would  face an uncertain supply of inputs,
ated.  Similar  activity  is  evident  in  the  Baltic  from fertilizer to spare parts.  Small-scale farm ma-
republics.  In the Baltics,  strong private  ownership  chinery is virtually  nonexistent.  Community  pres-
sentiment exists. Lease holding is seen as barrier to  sure  from  the  majority  of  older  and  unskilled
ownership.  A national  referendum  has  been  pro-  peasants may  also be a factor.  Collective and state
posed to determine the legality of private property.  farms are more than a place to work. Farms provide
An opinion poll conducted by the Russian Academy  stores, housing, schools, social activities, and access
of Agricultural  Sciences suggests that private prop-  to vacation resorts and medical care. This all-encom-
erty is unpopular.  The poll indicated that 83 percent  passing role makes leaving the collective  and state
of the  state  and  collective  farm  workers  and  88  farms difficult.
percent of the farm managers and technical special-  Finally,  shortages  of goods  available  for  rubles
ists in the Russian Republic are against private prop-  limit the incentive to work harder for more money.
erty  (Economist,  Dec. 1990).  Of  course,  the  This holds especially  true in the rural  areas where
popularity  of private  property  probably  will  vary  the supply of consumer goods  is often sporadic  at
greatly among the republics,  best.  The  increasing  reliance  on barter  trade  will
Numerous  reasons have been  given for the  slow  further inhibit small-scale agriculture. With the high
adoption and apparent lack of success of the  lease  transaction costs of barter trade, big is better. Collec-
campaign.  Most of these reasons can be related  to  tive and state farms are big and can capture this form
the  forms  of  private  property  arrangements  ad-  of economies  of  scale.  However,  if limited  land
vanced.  Except  in  the  republics  mentioned  pre-  markets  are  allowed to  develop, land as  a store of
viously, the adoption of private property  will likely  value may motivate potential private land owners.
be slow.  The laws  and decrees governing  property  The  policies  offered  to  date have  attempted  to
have  slowly  evolved  and  have  provided  a  frag-  provide incentives to individuals to take responsibil-
mented and vague legal framework  (Van Atta,  Jan.  ity for their actions and reap  the rewards  of work.
1990). Legal uncertainties give officials who oppose  Peasants were  to become the "master of the land."
reform justification to obstruct change.  The litany of reasons  these policies have not been
Collective and state farms under the current incen-  readily adopted is lengthy. Beyond the local political
tive system constitute a natural barrier to individual  and economic rationale stands the fact that the center
farming.  The  success  of  alternative  property  ar-  still  controls  most  economic  activity.  Individual
rangements, in some respects, highlights the failure  farmers will be cautious as long as most economic
of the collective  and state farms in particular,  and  transactions and resources are controlled by the cen-
collectivization in general.  Also, the control of the  ter and its appendages. Caution is particularly inher-
rural populace  through the collective and state farm  ent in the rural areas.  In the reform process, seeing
structures give a solid power base to the Communist  is believing. In most rural areas, little has changed.
Party  (Van  Atta,  Oct.  1989).  This dependency  ar-
rangement  built into the collective  and  state farm  CONCLUSION
system is politically expedient and will be difficult  The  lack  of progress  in  revitalizing  the  Soviet
to break.  economy has begun to drag on the reform process.
The current form of leases  keeps the power struc-  Basic  institutions  of the  Soviet  system  are  being
ture within the state and collective farm system. The  questioned, challenged,  and at times modified.  The
private  property  laws  also  keep  the  land  market  competition  for political  power has  become more
under tight control by the local  authorities.  In the  intense. The competition for political power is par-
lease arrangements, the collective or state farm is the  ticularly keen because of the stakes involved. In the
landlord,  input supplier,  and market  for the  inde-  Soviet  Union,  political  power  yields  control  over
pendent farmer.  Farm managers do not want to have  vast economic  power.  Combining  state  ownership
their best land or best workers  leave the farm,  and  with  central  planning  gives  the reigning  political
thus provide disincentives to leaving the farm. Indi-  power  complete control  over nearly every  facet of
vidual  farms  also  are  viewed  as  competition  for  economic life and the underlying resource base. This
103symbiosis  of political  and  economic  life  retards  vade the society and prevent the current system from
devolution of economic power to individuals,  working properly.  These campaigns will attempt to
The process of reform  will be slow.  The politics  root out illicit activities, but will provide reasons to
and  underlying  structure  of  the  government  and  eliminate productive, entrepreneurial  activities.
party apparatus form a built-in resistance to change.  Discipline  and  regulation  imply  control  from
The tendency will be to embrace order over disorder,  above. The burden of bureaucratic  interference will
particularly in times of economic malaise.  Democ-  continue  to delay  the incorporation  of true incen-
racy and free markets are desired, but with discipline  tives.  This, in turn, will solidify  the  cynicism that
and regulation. The future path of reform will focus  pervades the society.  Change will come, but it will
on these traits. Campaigns will arise to eliminate the  be a disappointment if measured with our timetable.
"mafia" and other dark forces  that apparently  per-
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